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Copp: Counter-Mortar Operational Research in the 21 Army Group

Terry Copp

T

he campaign in Northwest Europe h a s
been the subject of thousands of books
and articles, including a number based on
careful documentary research. But even the
best accounts pay insufficient attention to
the German weapons systems that inflicted
the majority of Allied casualties. The mortar
and the Nebelwerfer were chiefly responsible
for the Wehrmacht's temporary success in
stabilizing the front in Normandy, and for the
balance of the war they played a major role in
demoralizing and reducing the strength of
Allied infantry units. The Allies did not
foresee the central role these weapons would
play in Northwest Europe and all three armies
left counter-mortar operations to the initiative
of individual divisional commanders.
This paper focuses on the work of 21 Army
Group's No. 2 Operational Research Section
(ORS) in developing a s y s t e m a t i c and
ultimately successful system of neutralizing
enemy mortar and Nebelwerfer fire. Other
attempts to deal with the problem were
undertaken
concurrently
in
the
Mediterranean theatre and in First American
Army but they are not examined here.

T

he British Army became involved in
operational research in 1940 when P. M .S.
Blackett was appointed scientific advisor to
Anti-Aircraft Command. Blackett's "Circus,"
as the army's first OR group was called,
developed into two quite separate sections,
one dealing with radar equipment, and the
other with p r o b l e m s of o p e r a t i n g t h a t
equipment effectively with the available
personnel. Blackett instructed a group of

very y o u n g a n d very b r i g h t scientific
generalists to figure out what to do with the
first Gun Laying radar, the GL Mark I. It
consisted of a small hut with an aerial attached
to it. The entire hut could be rotated by a pair
of bicycle pedals at the top of a column. The
levelness of the immediate area, the soil type,
the weather, and the proximity of trees and
h u t s distorted the signal. Each set had to be
"screened" with chicken wire, and individually
calibrated. Even then there was little chance
of hitting anything because minor h u m a n
errors c o m p o u n d e d the p r o b l e m s of a
rudimentary fire control apparatus. This was
an ideal problem for OR investigation involving
the interface of men and complex equipment.
During the course of the war technical
developments in radar were paralleled by
improvements in training and operational
procedures developed by the OR section. In
1944 Anti-Aircraft command played a major
role in the destruction of the VI Flying Bomb. 1
After Blackett left the Army to establish
an OR section with RAF Coastal Command, a
South African physicist, Lieutenant-Colonel,
later Brigadier, B.F.G. Schonland became
the Superintendent of the Army Operational
Research Group (AORG). Schonland had
served in the First World War with the Royal
Engineers. He was twice mentioned-indispatches and ended the war as a Chief
Instructor in Wireless Communications. In
the interwar period he e s t a b l i s h e d an
international scientific reputation for his
studies of lightning, and he was an early
e x p e r i m e n t e r with c a t h o d e ray t u b e s .
Schonland's military and scientific credentials
were important, but it was his personality
that won him influence with military officers.
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In the spring of 1944 Montgomery agreed to a
proposal to appoint Schonland as Scientific
Advisor, 21 Army Group, a position which
gave Schonland immediate access to the
intelligence, planning, and operations staffs
of the Anglo-Canadian Army Group. 2
Schonland was determined to prevent
operational research from being restricted to
narrow technical functions. He, like Blackett,
was convinced that scientists should be
attached to operational commands, with direct
access to the real operational data. This had
a l r e a d y b e e n a c c o m p l i s h e d with A.A.
command and in 1941 an Army Operational
Research Section worked closely with the
Royal Navy to establish procedures for using
the first centrimetric coastal radar sets
designed to detect a German invasion fleet.

This naturally led to studies of the use of
radar in coastal artillery fire which had proven
much less accurate t h a n the gunners had
supposed. Schonland urged the Royal Artillery
to investigate the employment of radar as a
way of improving the accuracy of field and
medium artillery, b u t senior officers at
Larkhill, the artillery school, were not
impressed with the experimental evidence of
radar echoes from ground b u r s t s or with
suggestions that their methods of employing
predicted fire were subject to serious error.
Information that mortar bombs could be seen
in the early part of their trajectories by the
new (1943) GL Mark IIIB radars was also
ignored prior to the invasion of Northwest
E u r o p e , 3 p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e existing
counter-battery methods had proved adequate
for dealing with mortars in North Africa.

A crew from Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal training with the 3 -inch mortar, February 1943.
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Schonland continued to press for the
extension of OR into all areas of army activity
and by m i d - 1 9 4 3 operational r e s e a r c h
sections were established at the army schools
for airborne forces, artillery, armour and
infantry. The first scientist assigned to the
school of infantry at Barnard Castle in
Yorkshire was Captain Michael Swann, a
twenty-three year old REME officer with an
abbreviated war-time degree in Zoology.
Swann had taken the army radar course and
spent a winter in Iceland helping to optimize
local air and coastal defence practices. On
his return to the U.K. Schonland assigned
him to First Airborne Division where he worked
on aids for night operations and the radar
beacon system for paratroops known as
Rebecca-Eureka. 4
S w a n n s h a r e d many of S c h o n l a n d ' s
personality characteristics, including strong
intellectual curiosity and an easy manner in
dealing with officers of higher rank and greater
age. In Yorkshire the infantry instructors
discovered that Swann would devise and
implement systems for testing the efficacy of
both weapons and doctrines. His work on the
use of the Bren light machine gun, the PIAT
(a spring-loaded infantry anti-tank projector)
and the 2-inch and 3-inch infantry mortars
was instrumental in establishing guidelines
for their use. 5
Swann paid particular attention to mortars
and supervised elaborate tests of the "new"
stepped-up British 3-inch mortar, comparing
it to the German 81 mm mortar. 6 By the end
of 1943 Swann knew a great deal about Allied
and enemy mortars but he had not been
asked to tackle the problem of mortar location.
At this stage of the war hostile mortar location
was still part of the basic duties of field and
medium regimental counter-battery officers
who employed sound ranging, flash spotting,
crater analysis and other techniques to locate
enemy artillery.
In the spring of 1944 Schonland selected
a team of OR scientists to serve in the field
with Montgomery's 21 Army Group. They
were all generalists who had developed insight
and skills working with a specific branch of
the army. Michael Swann, despite the fact

that he was the youngest of the group, became
second-in-command and the effective leader
of No. 2 Operational Research Section.
During the preparations for and the
immediate aftermath of D-Day, the officers of
No. 2 ORS were assigned to a variety of high
priority tasks connected to radar or battlefield
investigation. It was not until D+17, J u n e 24,
that the section was in a position to undertake
new research. They began to visit the forward
area "to gain ideas of what fighting looked like
and to find out for ourselves where our
particular way of doing things fitted in." 7
Swann, who got caught up in the defence of a
newly-captured village during a German
counterattack, recalled that "in those days
the bridgehead was so small we could easily
drive down to the battle area in half an hour,
spend a day there and come back in the
evening, to bathe in the meandering River
Seulles, search for Calvados liqueur in Creully
and discuss at length the great problems
before us."
One of the chief problems was "the location
of enemy m o r t a r s , which were c a u s i n g
appalling casualties and proving almost
impossible to deal with." This was a classic
OR challenge, a problem "midway between
the technical and the operational." The first
thing to do was to establish the operational
facts and the section devoted as much time as
it could to gathering the n e c e s s a r y
information. The section's report began with
a statement of "The Extent of the Problem""
The German army uses mortars and Nebelwerfers
in large numbers. These weapons are small and
difficult to detect from the air; their trajectories
make it possible to conceal them completely from
ground observation, particularly in close country.
The small noise of discharge of the mortar and the
ripple fire of the Nebelwerfer make sound ranging
difficult, while the flash and smoke from the mortar
is slight and hard to spot. In defence the casualties
from mortars and nebelwerfers may be considerable,
while the strain of holding a position and being
mortared for days on end is intense. In attack the
casualties in forming up areas and on the objective
may be very heavy indeed, and are often decisive in
throwingback an attack. In either attack or defences,
mortars can make movement in forward areas
difficult.
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A private

from

Le Régiment de Maisonneuve and a French civilian examine a captured German Nebelwerfer.
Photo by Lt. George Cooper, NAC PA 129127

So much has long be realized. In the present
campaign, however, casualties from mortars have
been particularly heavy and have contributed as
much as anything else to making advances slow
and costly. The enemy's mortars are as much a
weapon to be defeated as his tanks. This will
continue as long as fighting goes on in undulating
and cultivated country. Even on the plains of
Picardy and Flanders, there is enough cover to
conceal mortars, and although their importance
may decline, they are still likely to prove a great
source of trouble. 8

as fifty-seven 81 mm mortars and between 12
and 20 of the 120 mm type. Panzer divisions
were equipped with about half these numbers.
In Normandy, the German army had also
provided a regiment composed of 54 sixbarrel Nebelwerfers on the scale of one per
division. Swann estimated that to bring the
problem under control divisions might need
to obtain between 60 and 80 hostile mortar
locations.

Swarm interviewed battalion medical
officers from four different mortar divisions
and found that all agreed in placing the
proportion of mortar casualties at above 70%
of total casualties. He found that divisional
C o u n t e r - M o r t a r staffs t e n d e d t o u n derestimate the number of mortars and
Nebelwerfers opposite them, noting that a
German infantry division possessed as many

He noted that "at present no official
organization for counter-mortar work" existed
in the British Army and each division went its
own way. All the divisions surveyed had
appointed a Counter-Mortar Officer and
a l l o t t e d s i g n a l s c a p a c i t y to allow for
communication to the plotting centre, but
arrangements were ad hoc and no one was
sure what worked best. Swann analyzed the
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Hostile Mortar Lists compiled by four
divisions.
Each used sound bearings
extensively, but there was no system for
ensuring the rapid reporting of all instances
of enemy mortaring and only one division had
established separate observation posts with
the responsibility for mortar location. Air
photographs were widely used in conjunction
with s o u n d b e a r i n g s a n d h a d proved
particularly effective in locating Nebelwerfers
which were sometimes c o n c e n t r a t e d in
batteries. Observation aircraft were generally
unable to spot mortars though the flash and
smoke of the Nebelwerfer rockets were
occasionally seen. Flash spotting, either
from the ground or from sixty-foot towers,
which had worked so well in the desert, was
of little use in Normandy where the Germans
almost always fired from reverse slope
positions. The microphones of the CounterBattery sound-ranging bases, deployed 4,000
to 5,000 yards behind the Forward Defence
Line, occasionally picked up mortar locations
but only one division had seriously exploited
this resource.
Four-pen recorders, a miniature (1,500
yards) sound-ranging base of four posts
connected to a recording machine in which
four pens recorded the vibrations from the

four microphones and deduced the location
of the hostile mortar, 9 were in use b u t there
were only three sets available in all of 21
Army Group. When in working condition the
four-pen recorder produced good results, but
the gunners and infantrymen assigned to
maintain and operate them had not been
properly trained nor had an OR team been
employed to study the man-machine interface.
Crater examination, a favoured method of
determining the bearing of hostile batteries
at the School of Artillery, was of little use in
battle conditions where probing about in a
recent mortar crater could not be realistically
recommended.
This left radar. The OR section was told
that a GL MK III had been tried out in the
early days of the invasion after it was reported
that mortar trajectories showed up on A.A.
battery radar sets. Indeed mortar bombs had
been detected at ranges of 7,000 yards and
Nebelwerfer clusters at 11,000 yards. Field
trials had met with mixed success and had
not been followed up. Schonland and Swann
believed that the OR section could help the
army to greatly increase the effectiveness of
radar. If further GL MK III and 4-pen recorders
were made available, and the work coordinated with properly trained counter-

A German Nebelwerfer battery prepares Jor action. Each German division in Normandy had at its disposal one
Nebelwerfer regiment composed of 54 six-barrelled launcher.
The 15 cm Nebelwerfer could ripple off six shells
in 10 seconds or three salvoes of six shells injive minutes to a maximum distance of 6900 metres. The peculiar
noise made by the Nebelwerfer led Allied troops to name it "Moaning Minnie. "
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mortar staffs, the goal of 60 to 80 locations a
day could be reached on static fronts. 10 Swann
cautioned that even with such changes,
existing radar and four-pen recorders were
useful only on static fronts and could not
a s s i s t w h e r e improved c o u n t e r - m o r t a r
methods were most needed, in advance and
consolidation.

A German 80 mm mortar crew in action. This weapon
could throw a 3.5 kg high explosive or smoke shell to
a minimum distance of 60 metres or a maximum of
2400 metres at a rate of 15-25 shells per minute. The
difficulty of spotting a well-emplaced mortar crew is
evident from these photos.

No. 2 ORS's Report on the Location of
Enemy Mortars was delayed by orders that
the section give priority to a study of the
effectiveness of heavy bombers in the land
battle, so it did not reach the Counter-Mortar
Committee of Second British Army until early
August. 11 Brigadier Schonland was present
to argue the case Swann had made and to add
his own views about the role of radar on the
battlefield. He noted that the American SCR
584 was vastly preferable to the British or
Canadian GL Ills but none were available.
The new British 10 cm equipment, the F.A.3
which was mounted on a half-track, was wellsuited for employment in the field but the
first three would not be delivered until midOctober. In the meantime it was important to
organize counter-mortar units with a staff at
divisional H.Q. and an officer with a small
staff at each brigade. The Canadians had
already added personnel to man specific
counter-mortar listening posts and this
system was adopted in British Second Army.
The Corps Survey Regiment was to receive
extra personnel and equipment to operate
additional Four-Pen Recorder teams across
the front. The Committee also decided to
recommend the creation of a "Radar Battery"
for each army "organized into 3 sections of 3
GL Ills plus 1 spare." It was agreed that "in
view of the extreme urgency of the problem
there m u s t be no lengthy haggling over
details." 12
By late September both 1 Canadian Radar
Battery and 100 British Radar Battery were
organized and a ten day training course "in
the theory and drill of locating mortars" was
underway.
At t h e d i v i s i o n a l level,
organizational changes were implemented in
time to assist the British in the Arnhem
Salient and the Canadians in the battle of the
Scheldt, but the two Radar Batteries were not
ready for an operational role until J a n u a r y
1945.
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The Canadian Radar Battery was deployed
in the Nijmegen area in support of British and
Canadian units of First Canadian Army. A
scheme, Operation "Trojan," was devised to
draw enemy fire and the radar sections
pinpointed 19 locations in a three hour period.
Three weeks later they played an important
role in Operation "Elephant," an attack on a
small but well-defended German position at
Kapelsche Veer. Two GL Ills were deployed to
cover the area across the River Maas and
almost complete success was obtained in
locating and relocating enemy mortars. 1 3

The relative success of post-Normandy
counter-mortar techniques inevitably raises
the question of why such a system was not in
place earlier. All of the equipment actually
used in 1945 was available in 1943 b u t the
Army Operational Research Group was unable
to persuade the Royal Artillery that the
available radar equipment should be employed
in land battle. The Mk III Gun Laying sets
were in short supply and most of the available
ones went to Anti-Aircraft Command and the
Anti-Aircraft batteries for the defence of the
Allied bridgehead in Normandy.

The enemy quickly reacted to these and
other examples of improved mortar location
techniques by waiting for long intervals
between rounds, or firing a few rounds before
moving some distance away. Both of these
counter-measures "worked" in the sense that
locations were more difficult to obtain, but
escaping detection is not the main task
assigned to mortar crews. 14

There were other reasons for the slow
recognition of the part radar might play in
artillery support of land operations. When
scientists of the Army Operational Research
Group began to investigate the accuracy of
predicted artillery fire they found that the
gunners, who saw themselves as the scientists
of the battlefield, h a d developed their
techniques using a set of assumptions which
rarely turned out to be as accurate as battle
conditions demanded. The OR group fought
a struggle, parallel to the one described here,
to persuade the gunners to examine the results
of predicted fire and to make use of radar in
a number of ways including checking the
RAF's "Meteor" messages which provided the
essential information on air pressure, wind
strength, and direction. Members of No.2
ORS played a major role in converting the
artillery to an operational research approach
to gunnery but they could not accomplish
this until the gunners themselves recognized
the problem. Before the end of the battle of
Normandy artillery officers were convinced
that operational research was of great value
and t h a t Schonland's advice should be
followed. This was a bit late for the soldiers
who fought in Normandy, but two months is
a relatively short period for most h u m a n s or
most organizations to learn new ways of
dealing with their problems.

The real test of the new counter-mortar
methods came in Operation "Veritable," the
Anglo-Canadian attack down the west bank
of the Rhine. Both the Canadian and British
Radar Batteries were deployed to provide
counter-mortar information and near
complete success was obtained. The attacking
infantry reached their initial objectives,
consolidated and moved forward to the next
phase without any interference from enemy
mortars. 1 5 As the troops advanced south they
moved out of range and the radar sets had to
be moved forward quickly.
One section
working with 2nd Canadian Division came
under heavy shellfire and two men were killed,
t h o u g h t h e set was not d a m a g e d and
continued to report hostile mortar locations.
The Germans used enormous quantities
of artillery, Nebelwerfer and mortar fire in
resisting the Allied advance and there was
c o n s t a n t p r e s s u r e o n all t h e r a d a r
detachments until the battle ended in early
March. Ten-ton radar sets proved to be of
limited mobility in the flooded Rhineland
landscape but they were relocated in forward
areas and made a significant contribution to
reducing casualties and speeding the advance.
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